I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of gene patentability implicates everyone from doctors, to patients, to biotechnology researchers, to holders of patents claiming genes of all kinds. Proponents of gene patents argue that patents are necessary for incentivizing innovation, commercializing valuable inventions, and promoting the disclosure of information for the benefit of the public, and that these objectives are particularly important in the biotechnology industry. Opponents of gene patents fear that the exclusive rights conferred by a patent restrict public access to medical treatments and diagnostic methods, which raises serious questions about the appropriate scope of such patents. These opposing positions spur the gene patent debate. To resolve this debate, the need to incentivize innovation must be balanced with the need to make medical testing and treatment readily available and affordable to the public. This Comment argues that isolated genes are proper subjects for patent claims and should not be categorically excluded from patenteligible subject matter. Additionally, however, this Comment recognizes that gene patents raise legitimate concern about patient access to highquality genetic tests; therefore, Congress should enact certain research exemptions that would immunize researchers from infringement liability for performing noncommercial activities involving a patented gene. Part II.A discusses the purpose of the United States Patent Act and summarizes the subjects considered eligible for patent protection under current law. Part II.B briefly describes the science underlying gene patents and discusses gene patents in the context of an ongoing case, Part II.C then explains opposing concerns surrounding gene patents, including the need to incentivize research, the need to make genetic testing available and affordable to patients, and the role that gene patents will likely play in whole genome sequencing. Part III.A emphasizes the importance of continuing to hold genes to be patent-eligible subject matter, while using the current requirements of patentability to invalidate claims undeserving of patent protection. Part III.B suggests solutions to the gene patent debate and examines the merits of each proposed solution. Finally, Part IV concludes that Congress should enact a statutory research exemption and cautiously consider alternative solutions like compulsory licensing or exercising march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act.
II. BACKGROUND

A. United States Patent Law
Purpose of Patents
The Constitution authorizes Congress to grant patents to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 2 A patent confers on an inventor "the right to exclude others from making, using, . . . or selling [his] invention" for twenty years. 3 Several justifications exist for granting these exclusive rights, although there is some disagreement over the validity of these theories. 4 First, patent rights incentivize useful inventions by promising inventors and investors the opportunity to profit from their expended time, effort, and money. 5 Second, patent rights incentivize the commercialization of inventions. 6 Patents promote not only investments in research and development, but also the investments needed to make inventions commercially available for the benefit of the public. 7 And third, patent rights incentivize disclosure of inventions.
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter and Patentability
To be valid, a patent claim must first be directed to patent-eligible subject matter, 18 and then must satisfy the additional requirements of utility, 19 novelty, 20 nonobviousness, 21 and adequate disclosure. 22 Thus, patent eligibility presents a threshold inquiry that must be resolved before a court turns to the other elements of patentability. 23 Patent eligibility requires the subject matter of an invention to be the type of discovery that Congress intended to protect. 24 The scope of patenteligible subject matter is outlined in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides that processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter are proper subjects for patents. The categories of patent-eligible subject matter have been broadly construed in accordance with "the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting 'the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.'" 26 The Patent Act provides that a patent may be granted for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 27 Congress need not authorize patent protection for specific subject matters; instead, courts determine whether the subject falls within one of the statutorily defined categories. 28 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that Congress intended patent-eligible subject matter to "include anything under the sun 
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PATENTING DNA 261 that is made by man." 29 Even living organisms-from a genetically engineered bacterium 30 to plant breeds developed by humans 31 -are proper subjects for patents, provided they are the product of human intervention. 32 The scope of the U.S. patent laws is necessarily broad, as to include scientific advances that were unforeseeable when Congress enacted § 101. Although courts have broadly construed the language of § 101, the scope of patent-eligible subject matter is limited by three judicially created exceptions 34 : "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas."
35
Although inventions or discoveries that fall within these excepted categories might properly be classified as patent-eligible processes or compositions of matter, they are not the type of invention that patents are intended to protect; 36 rather, "they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work." 37 A patent on these "tools" might improperly restrict further discovery. 38 As such, a botanist could not patent a new plant discovered in the wild, nor could a physicist patent the law of gravity. 39 Similarly, a scientist who discovers certain natural qualities of bacteria cannot obtain a patent on those qualities. 40 These specific exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter have been well established for over 150 years, 43 and the Supreme Court has thus far declined to carve out any additional exceptions. 44 Rather, the requirements of utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure should ensure that patent protection is not improperly afforded to a discovery or invention. 45 Furthermore, the Court has cautioned lower courts against imposing bright-line limitations on patent-eligible subject matter, 46 stating that a public-policy-based limitation on patent eligibility should come from Congress. 47 Such a decision requires a "balancing of competing values and interests," which must be conducted by elected representatives, not courts.
48
So for now, laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are the only subject matters expressly excluded from patent eligibility.
While a patent cannot claim one of these excepted categories, a patent may claim an application of a law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea to a structure or process. 49 In other words, "a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of 41 44. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10, 316-17 (concluding that genetically engineered bacterium is patent-eligible subject matter because it does not fall within the natural phenomenon exception and refusing to establish a bright-line, policy-based rule against patenting living organisms). In Bilski, Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, advocated creating a bright-line rule excluding business methods from patent-eligible subject matter, but the majority declined to do so. 130 S. Ct. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring).
45. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (explaining that "[c]oncerns about attempts to call any form of human activity a 'process' can be met by making sure the claim meets the requirements of § 101" instead of establishing an additional exception to patent eligibility).
46. The process must contain other elements exhibiting an "inventive concept," such that the claimed invention is much more than the law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea itself. 52 For example, the Arrhenius equation, which provides the cure time for rubber as a function of temperature, 53 is a formula reflecting a law of nature and is therefore not patent-eligible subject matter. 54 But a process for molding rubber that utilizes the Arrhenius equation is properly considered patent eligible. 55 The process must still meet the other requirements for patentability, but at the very least, it satisfies the threshold inquiry. 56 Essentially, an inventor may not claim the formula in the abstract; 57 rather, he must claim use of the formula in conjunction with an inventive structure or process.
58
B. United States Patent Law in the Context of Gene Patents
Until recently, § 101 has been a fairly dormant area of patent law.
59
But a number of recent cases-including several involving gene patents-have changed that. Below is a brief explanation of the science underlying gene patents, followed by a discussion of recent litigation over gene patents, focusing on Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
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A few key points will simplify the underlying science and facilitate a discussion of various issues raised by gene patents. First, the specific DNA sequence comprising a particular gene exists naturally in the human body as an integrated piece of a larger biological structure. 71 An isolated gene is a sequence of DNA cleaved from surrounding genetic material and removed from its natural cellular environment. 72 In this Comment, the term "gene patent" refers to a patent claiming an isolated gene (also referred to as an isolated sequence of DNA) or to a patent claiming a diagnostic method involving an isolated gene. 73 There, a group of plaintiffs, comprised of various medical organizations, genetic researchers and counselors, and breast cancer and ovarian cancer patients, 74 is suing Myriad Genetics asking the court to invalidate Myriad's patent claims to the BRCA genes on grounds that human genes are patent-ineligible subject matter. 75 The challenged patent claims pertain to the isolated BRCA genes and diagnostic methods involving those genes. 76 The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that Myriad's claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. 77 However, the Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that the composition claim to isolated DNA and one of the diagnostic method claims were directed to patent-eligible subject matter. 78 human body. Crichton's statement does, however, reflect some of the concerns triggered by patents relating to the human body.
86
Nonetheless, in keeping with the USPTO's longstanding position on patent claims involving genes, the Federal Circuit in its original decision in Association for Molecular Pathology held that "claims to isolated DNAs . . . are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101." 87 In so doing, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's attempt to fit isolated DNA molecules within the "products of nature" exception to patent eligibility. 88 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit stated that Mayo does not control the question of patent eligibility with respect to the composition-of-matter claims, 89 In Chakrabarty, the Court held that a manmade living organism was patent-eligible subject matter. 93 The bacteria at issue were genetically engineered to break down multiple components of crude oil, which no single naturally occurring bacterium could do.
94
This capability had important applications in cleaning oil spills. 95 Because the "claim [was] not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product of human ingenuity 'having a distinctive name, character [and] use,'" the Court held the bacteria to be patent eligible. 96 The Court distinguished the bacteria in Chakrabarty from the newly discovered but naturally occurring bacterial trait that was held to be patent-ineligible subject matter in Funk Bros., finding that the bacteria in Chakrabarty had "markedly different characteristics from any [bacterium] found in nature," derived from the efforts of the patentee. 97 Relying on Chakrabarty, the Federal Circuit in Association for Molecular Pathology concluded that claims to isolated DNA molecules are "drawn to patent-eligible subject matter because the claims cover molecules that are markedly different-have a distinctive chemical structure and identity-from those found in nature." 98 The court relied on the fact that isolated DNA molecules are cleaved from a larger structural complex or, in some cases, are chemically synthesized, giving them a chemical structure different from that of native DNA. 99 A DNA molecule, "when it is bonded to other genetic material, is worlds apart from . . . an isolated DNA molecule that is in hand and usable." The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that isolated DNA is not "markedly different" from native DNA because they both share the same nucleotide sequence. 102 The court reasoned that "the patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is not negated because it has similar informational properties to a different, more complex natural material." Instead the court relied on the distinct structure and identity of isolated DNA to uphold its patent eligibility. 103 The court concluded that isolated DNA is a manmade invention, rather than a product of nature, and is therefore patent-eligible subject matter. Diagnostic method claims are directed to a "correlation between a patient's medical data and a medical prognosis." 106 For example, a claim directed to a method for measuring the level of a particular amino acid in a patient and using that measurement to diagnose a vitamin deficiency is a diagnostic method claim.
107 Genetic diagnostic claims involve correlations between a specific DNA sequence and a particular disease. 108 These types of claims raise concerns because a correlation is a law of nature 109 -the fact that a certain measurement indicates a vitamin deficiency, or that a certain genetic mutation indicates an increased risk of disease is a naturally occurring correlation that cannot be patented. But, a method that applies that law of nature to a diagnostic purpose can be patented. 110 Thus, concerns arise that a diagnostic method patent comes too close to patenting the law of nature itself, thereby allowing the patent holder to circumvent the established rules of patent eligibility. However, diagnostic method claims must pass the threshold test pertaining to patent-eligible subject matter, 111 which should theoretically avoid the realization of such concerns. Courts consider a variety of factors in determining the patent eligibility of a claimed method. The machine-or-transformation test is one such consideration. 112 Under this test, courts determine whether the claim "(1) . . . is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) . . . transforms a particular article into a different state or thing." 113 The presence of these factors can support a finding of patent eligibility. 114 Although the Court recently held that the machine-or-transformation test is not a bright-line rule and is not conclusive on the issue of patent eligibility, it also noted that the test is a "useful and important clue." 115 Thus, the test remains relevant to discussions regarding the patent eligibility of diagnostic method claims.
i. The Federal Circuit's Original Decision
In its original decision in Association for Molecular Pathology, the Federal Circuit addressed the patent eligibility of Myriad's "method claims directed to 'comparing' or 'analyzing' DNA sequences," finding those claims to fit into the "abstract, mental steps" exception to patenteligible subject matter. 116 Myriad's "comparing" and "analyzing" claim language describes a "'method for screening a tumor sample,' by 'comparing' a first BRCA1 sequence from a tumor sample and a second BRCA1 sequence from a non-tumor sample, wherein a difference in sequence indicates an alteration in the tumor sample." 117 The court held this claim describes only the abstract mental steps involved in comparing two strings of nucleotide bases, and it was therefore not directed to a patent-eligible process. 
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Also in its original decision, the Federal Circuit held one of Myriad's method claims to be patent eligible. Myriad's claim to a "method for screening potential cancer therapeutics" included "steps of 'growing' transformed cells in the presence or absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, an inherently transformative step involving the manipulation of the cells and their growth medium," as well as "'determining' the cells' growth rates, a step that also necessarily involves physical manipulation of the cells." 119 The court found both of these steps to be central to the claimed diagnostic method and therefore held the claim to be directed to patent-eligible subject matter. 121 The claims at issue in Mayo involved a method for optimizing the efficacy of a patient's autoimmune disease treatment.
122
The method used natural laws to describe the relationship between a drug's metabolite levels in a patient and the efficacy or toxicity of drug treatment. 123 Specifically, one patent claim set forth the following relationships: if the metabolite levels exceed a certain threshold, then the administered dose is likely to induce harmful side effects, so the dose should be decreased; conversely, if the metabolite levels are lower than a certain threshold, then the administered dose is likely ineffective, so the dose should be increased. 124 The Federal Circuit in Mayo found that the claimed steps of administering a drug to a patient, determining the drug's metabolite levels in the patient, and using those metabolite measurements to determine subsequent drug dosages constituted the "application of naturally occurring correlations," and therefore held the method to be directed to patent-eligible subject matter. 125 The court also found that the method satisfied the machine-or-transformation test, as administering a drug transforms a patient's body chemistry, and determining metabolite levels requires transforming blood and tissue samples to extract metabolites and determine their levels.
126
Finding these steps to be central to the claim 127 -as opposed to mere data-gathering steps, which are not patentable as processes under § 101 128 -the Federal Circuit held the diagnostic method claim in Mayo was directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
129
The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the claims in Mayo attempted to patent a law of nature. 130 The Court summarized the claims as instructing doctors to "(1) measure (somehow) the current level of the relevant metabolite, (2) use particular (unpatentable) laws of nature . . . to calculate the current toxicity/inefficacy limits, and (3) reconsider the drug dosage in light of the law."
131 In other words, the Court found that the claim simply stated the law, and then told doctors to somehow apply it.
132
Upon further consideration in light of Mayo, the Federal Circuit in Association for Molecular Pathology reaffirmed its earlier ruling with respect to Myriad's method claims. 133 The court again invalidated the "comparing" and "analyzing" claims, reiterating its prior logic for finding the claims to cover an abstract mental process, and further finding the claims "indistinguishable" from the claims invalidated by the In contrast, the Federal Circuit upheld Myriad's claim to a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics. 136 In doing so, the court both affirmed its prior logic and distinguished the screening method from the claims at issue in Mayo.
137
Myriad's method claim comprises "(1) growing host cells transformed with an altered BRCA1 gene in the presence or absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, (2) determining the growth rate of the host cells with or without the potential therapeutic, and (3) comparing the growth rate of the host cells." 138 The plaintiffs argued that the "determining" and "comparing" steps preempted a law of nature, like the claims that were invalidated in Mayo. 139 The court, however, focused on the "transformed" nature of the cells-in other words, the cells are not naturally occurring, but are instead "derived by altering a cell to include a foreign gene, resulting in a man-made, transformed cell with enhanced function and utility."
140 Thus, the screening method is more than an abstract mental step or law of nature, and the claim does more than "simply state the law of nature while adding the words 'apply it. '" 141 Rather, the claim recites steps that are applied to manmade, transformed cells.
142
Because the underlying subject matter-a manmade, transformed cell-is patent eligible, a method applying various procedures to that subject is also patent eligible.
143
This distinguishes Myriad's claim from the claims in Mayo, where the recited steps were insufficient to differentiate the method from the underlying law of nature.
144 Therefore, the court reaffirmed its prior ruling and Now, the Supreme Court has second opportunity to weigh-in on the issue of patent-eligible subject matter, as the plaintiffs have filed a second petition for certiorari.
C. Opposing Policy Concerns Give Rise to the Gene Patent Debate
Proponents of gene patents argue that patents are needed to incentivize invention, commercialization of valuable inventions, and disclosure of information for the benefit of the public, and that these incentives are particularly important in the biotechnology industry. Opponents of gene patents fear that patented services and testing will be unaffordable or otherwise inaccessible to consumers. These opposing positions give rise to the gene patent debate; each position is discussed in greater detail below. The effect of gene patents on whole genome sequencing and personalized medicine is an especially important topic in the debate, so it receives its own section.
Incentivizing Genetic Research
Patents incentivize individuals to invest their time and money in discovering and commercializing inventions that ultimately benefit society.
146 This is especially true in the biotechnology industry. In fact, patents for genes have been characterized as the "fuel" for the "R&D engine" that produces and commercializes biotechnologies. 
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PATENTING DNA 275 the promise of patent protection was the only reason Myriad was able to make the initial research and development investment. 149 Due to the significant time and money required to develop and commercialize biotechnologies, researchers and investors need assurance that intellectual property protection will enable them to realize some return on their investment. 150 But, there is more to the story of the biotechnology industry's need for intellectual property rights. Myriad is a large corporation, with over 1,100 employees and fiscal year 2011 revenue of over $400 million.
151
Most biotechnology companies, however, are small start-up businesses, with less than 50 employees working on products that may take over a decade to produce. 152 Because these businesses generate no immediate revenue from product sales, they must raise hundreds of millions of dollars to research, develop, and commercialize their inventions.
153
"Patents 'are typically the only assets those firms possess that are sufficiently stable and valuable to attract the large amounts of capital they need to exploit promising research toward new drugs and diagnostics. '" 154 Thus, patent rights are critical to the survival and success of these small biotechnology companies.
Nonetheless, some scholars oppose the assertion that patents are necessary to stimulate scientific innovation. The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) investigated "the effects of patents and licensing practices on basic genetic research, genetic test development, patient access to genetic tests, and genetic testing quality," concluding that "patents on genetic discoveries do not 149 SACGHS found that scientists are usually motivated to conduct research by a "desire to advance understanding, the hope of improving patient care through new discoveries, and concerns for their own career advancement," rather than by the promise of patent protection. 156 Furthermore, SACGHS stated that much of the funding for basic genetic research likely comes from the federal government, 157 so using patents to stimulate private investment is not essential to promoting basic genetic research.
158
Academia already encourages sharing research and publishing discoveries, 159 and in industry, the clinical community requires disclosure before accepting new healthcare products or services, so the report concluded that patents are not needed to stimulate disclosure. 160 SACGHS also concluded that exclusive rights conferred by a patent do not necessarily spur faster test development. 161 SACGHS studied a number of tests and did not find that patent protection corresponded to
Steven Teutsch, Introductory Letter to SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC'Y, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (2010)
, http://oba.od.nih.gov/ oba/sacghs/reports/sacghs_patents_report_2010.pdf. But see the Statement of Dissent to the SACGHS report, which recognizes the importance of supporting innovation and converting genetic discoveries into accessible diagnostic and treatment tools, and also notes that the cost of developing these tools has dramatically increased. Mara Aspinall et al., Statement of Dissent to SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON 
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the speed with which a test reaches the market. 162 The SACGHS report determined that not only are patents unneeded to motivate genetic research and investment in genetic research, but also that patents can actually harm these goals by discouraging follow-on research. 163 In some cases, SACGHS found, patents are used to gain a market advantage over existing competition, which limits access and does not provide the benefit of stimulating innovation. 164 
Availability and Affordability of Medical Testing
Patient access to genetic testing depends on "first, basic genetic research that generates insights into the genetic basis of particular diseases and, second, efforts to translate those discoveries into clinically useful, widely available tests." 165 The SACGHS report theorized that when a single entity holds a patent to a genetic test, patients have limited access to high-quality testing for a number of reasons. 166 If the sole provider of the test does not accept the patient's insurance, the patient might be unable to afford the test. 167 Additionally, second-opinion testing is unavailable. 168 Finally, the SACGHS report expresses concerns about patents eliminating competition that would otherwise lead to improved quality of testing techniques, and thus limiting patient access to high-quality testing. 169 However, three of the eighteen voting members of SACGHS issued a dissenting statement to the SACGHS report. 170 The dissent challenged the conclusions of the SACGHS report, noting that in general, the current U.S. healthcare system does not provide equal, unlimited access to medical care and diagnostic tests. 171 Patient access to healthcare is not a problem unique to genetic testing and therefore will not be solved by 162 172 Insurance companies are free to refuse to cover genetic testing, regardless of related patents or the number of providers offering the tests. 173 The dissent stated that implementing the SACGHS report recommendations would do more harm than good in terms of patient access to high-quality genetic testing. 174 Additionally, when SACGHS commissioned case studies to determine the effect of patents and exclusive licenses on the price of genetic tests, the case studies did not produce evidence that patents and exclusive licenses consistently lead to higher costs to patients. 175 While SACGHS investigated claims that patents lead to inflated prices for genetic tests, it found no concrete evidence to this effect. 176 In fact, one case study found that the unit price of the full-sequence BRCA test was comparable to other full-sequence tests performed at both commercial and nonprofit laboratories. In addition to general availability and affordability concerns, gene patent opponents specifically voice a major concern about the effect gene patents will have on whole-genome sequencing and personalized medicine. 178 Opponents fear that as an increasing number of gene patents are issued to many different inventors, these intellectual property rights will create a "patent thicket," forcing a whole-genome sequencing firm to negotiate licenses with each holder of a gene patent, potentially requiring thousands of licenses from many licensors. 
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licenses as necessary might prove to be prohibitively expensive and therefore might impede scientific progress in the fields of whole-genome sequencing and personalized medicine. 180 The dissent in Association for Molecular Pathology worried that "this may well be [an area] in which 'too much patent protection can impede rather than promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'" 181 However, whether this is a serious concern has yet to be determined; 182 in fact, recent research reveals that current gene patents are unlikely to impede whole genome sequencing efforts in this way. First, there is a common misconception about the number of human genes that have actually been patented. 183 There is a widely cited statistic that 20% of human genes are patented. 184 But in fact, the study that led to this statistic actually demonstrated that "with respect to 20% of human genes known at the time they conducted their study, either (1) the DNA sequence of the gene, or (2) the amino acid sequence encoded by the gene, was mentioned in a US patent claim." 185 Contrary to the interpretation many have given to the article describing the study's findings, the mere fact that a patent claim mentions a human gene does not altogether exclude others from using the gene. 186 Thus, the quantity of existing gene patents does not necessarily create the feared patent thicket.
Furthermore, neither composition-of-matter claims to isolated genes nor diagnostic method claims involving genes are likely to impede progress in whole genome sequencing technology. Composition-of-KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 matter claims are unlikely to impede progress because current sequencing technology is unlikely to infringe a claim to an isolated DNA molecule.
187
Infringement of a claim to the isolated gene itself occurs only if the specific DNA sequence claimed is created or used during whole genome sequencing.
188
But current whole genome sequencing techniques are unlikely to do this; 189 instead, current sequencing techniques break DNA into small fragments, typically ranging from twenty-five to 1,000 nucleotides in length, and then sequence those fragments one base at a time. 190 Finally, the sequences for all fragments are assembled. 191 Thus, the likelihood of whole genome sequencing infringing a patent claim to a specific gene depends on the size of fragments generated.
192 A patent for a gene that is smaller than the fragments generated might be infringed by whole genome sequencing techniques. 193 While there are genes with sequences less than 1,000 nucleotides long, they are few, so current whole genome sequencing methods are unlikely to infringe claims to isolated genes.
194
Method claims for comparing and analyzing sequences for diagnostic purposes are more likely to be infringed by whole genome sequencing, but are also unlikely to impede whole genome sequencing efforts for primarily two reasons. First, claims directed only to comparison methods are probably invalid as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. 195 Like the comparing and analyzing steps at issue in Association for Molecular Pathology, these claims to comparison methods attempt to patent abstract ideas or mental processes and are therefore not the type of discovery the patent laws are intended to protect.
196 Second, claims directed to patent-eligible processes involving genes are more likely to be valid, but infringement might be avoided by 187 
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utilizing multiple actors to perform the steps in the method claim. 197 A method claim is infringed only if a single actor performs all steps, or controls the performance of all steps, in the claim. 198 If a genome sequencing company provides a patient with the results of his genetic sequencing, the company has performed only the initial step of the method claim.
199 If the patient then takes his sequence to a physician who compares the patient's sequence to a database containing sequences for genetic mutations, the physician has performed only the comparing and analyzing step. 200 While this is a somewhat simplified explanation of joint infringement, parties might avoid liability by having different actors perform these various steps.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Genes and Genetic Diagnostic Methods Should Not Be Categorically Excluded From Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
Based on the current standards for patentability, isolated genes are eligible subject matter for patents. " [A] nything under the sun that is made by man" 202 is an appropriate subject for a patent, and isolated DNA does not fit within one of the well-established exceptions to this general rule. 203 The Supreme Court has declined to carve out additional exceptions and has cautioned lower courts against doing so, suggesting that additional policy-based exceptions should come from Congress. 204 But both the Court and Congress should be wary of "adopting categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts." 205 The broad construction of the patent laws and the Court's hesitancy to recognize additional categorical exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter have been vital to affording patent protection to technological KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 advances unimaginable at the time § 101 was enacted. 206 Thus, neither Congress nor the Court, if it again grants certiorari in Association for Molecular Pathology, should categorically exclude genes from patenteligible subject matter.
1. Utility, Novelty, Nonobviousness, and Disclosure Requirements Should Be Used to Invalidate Questionable Patent Claims A party may challenge the validity of a particular patent claim by showing that the claim fails to meet the requirements of patentability. 207 First, a party may argue that the claim is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, i.e., the subject of the claim is not the type of discovery that should receive patent protection. 208 As discussed above, the subject of a claim is patent ineligible if it is properly characterized as a law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea. 209 Alternatively or additionally, a party can challenge the validity of a patent claim by showing that the discovery is not useful, new, or nonobvious, or that the claim does not satisfy statutory disclosure requirements. 210 Even if the subject of a claim is patent eligible, failure to comply with any of the other statutory requirements for patentability will render the claim invalid. It is necessary to distinguish patent eligibility from the other requirements of patentability. Indeed, the Federal Circuit in Association for Molecular Pathology repeatedly distinguished the concept of patent eligibility from patentability, emphasizing that the case addressed only the former issue. 211 A valid patent claim must be directed to patenteligible subject matter and satisfy the other criteria for patentability. A party can successfully challenge the validity of a patent claim without ever mentioning the patent eligibility of the subject matter. 212 The requirements of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness should be used to invalidate questionable patent claims; a new categorical exception to patent-eligible subject matter should not be used to achieve this purpose. By maintaining a broad interpretation of the statutory subject matter encompassed by § 101 and relying on the other requirements of patentability to invalidate claims, courts can apply a fine filter to all claims and determine which warrant patent protection under the current laws.
The creation of a new categorical exception to patent-eligible subject matter, on the other hand, would not allow courts to finely filter patent claims relating to isolated DNA, but would instead simply toss out any patents relating to genes.
To fully understand the undesirable consequences of this approach, it is necessary to consider the big picture as it pertains to gene patents. Much of the debate concerning gene patents focuses on the BRCA genes, Myriad's patents on those genes, and the consequences these patents have for breast cancer patients. This is only one aspect, though an important one, of the gene patent debate.
Categorical Exclusion of Gene Patents Will Have Wide-Ranging and
Unforeseen Impacts
Because the USPTO has issued gene patents for decades, a categorical exclusion of gene patents threatens the settled property rights and expectations of the biotechnology industry. 213 Furthermore, from a big-picture perspective, many biotechnology companies that have no interest in breast cancer research would suffer tremendously if genes were excluded from patent-eligible subject matter. All gene patent holders should not suffer from a challenge to merely fifteen patent claims within seven patents held by a single company. money on research and development 217 obtains a patent on a cucumber gene. The company relies on this patent to recoup on its research investment.
218 A patent on a cucumber gene does not elicit the same emotional response that the BRCA genes do, but the cucumber gene patent holder's interests depend on the ultimate resolution of Association for Molecular Pathology. If genes are excluded from patent-eligible subject matter, the cucumber gene patent holder, along with all the other small biotechnology companies holding such patents, loses its intellectual property rights, its opportunity to profit from its research and development investments, and, ultimately, its ability to stay in business. 219 While it is easy to lose sight of the cucumber patent holder among discussions about BRCA genes and Myriad, it is important to remember that the cucumber patent holder will fall as collateral damage to any action that narrows the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. Furthermore, as Part II.C.1 explains, most biotechnology firms are small businesses. The cucumber patent holder is actually the industry norm. These small businesses should not suffer from a categorical exclusion driven largely by a single, highly emotional case. Sauer's hypothetical illustrates the "wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts" that the Court in Bilski cautioned would follow from the adoption of a new categorical exclusion to patent-eligible subject matter.
220
B. Balancing the Competing Interests Surrounding Gene Patents
While isolated genes are appropriate subject matter for patents, 221 gene patents raise valid concerns about patient access to high-quality genetic tests. 222 Congress should balance the interest of incentivizing scientific innovation with the availability of certain medical tests and treatments. In discussing potential methods for balancing these interests, two preliminary points are noteworthy. First, these competing interests are not unique to gene patents. As noted by the Federal Circuit, "Inherent in our patent system is a 'tension between the desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to create an incentive to deploy those resources' by granting the right to exclude to those who promote the progress of the useful arts." 223 The current system recognizes these competing interests, and the patentability requirements discussed above are the means chosen to balance them. Second, it is necessary to define the proper role of patent law in this debate. For example, some critics of gene patents complain that not all insurance companies cover genetic testing. 224 Health insurance is undoubtedly an issue of great importance. But it is not a concern unique to genetic testing, nor is it the job of the USPTO to address such concerns. Neither the country's health insurance industry, nor a particular company's business practice is an issue properly addressed by the patent laws. Similarly, some critics of gene patents oppose the fees associated with genetic testing. 225 Such criticism fails to account for the tremendous amount of time and money a company invests in developing such tests. While performing the actual test might be relatively inexpensive, the company likely spent hundreds of millions of dollars on researching and developing the test, which it must recoup. 226 Again, these concerns fall outside the scope of issues properly addressed by patent law. Thus, the potential balancing solutions suggested below will not address such issues.
Suggestions from Previous Policy Reports
Previous policy reports from around the world have suggested means for balancing these competing interests. 227 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics suggested that the scope of protection for patents claiming isolated sequences of DNA be limited to the specific uses the inventor has demonstrated that the sequences may be put to, rendering the "scope of the monopoly awarded . . . commensurate with the actual contribution by the inventor." 228 The Australian Law Reform Commission outlined an "experimental use exemption that would not be precluded by a commercial objective in undertaking the research." 229 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 230 encouraged patent holders to license genetic inventions "on terms and conditions that seek to ensure the widest public access to, and variety of, products and services based on the inventions." 231 Finally, the Federal Trade Commission suggested that patents with an extremely broad scope should be limited, and that challenging invalid patents should be made easier. 232 The following discussion expands on some of these suggestions and examines their merits. Congress should enact a statutory research exemption for research activities involving patented genes and consider solutions like compulsory licensing or exercising march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act 233 with caution, because such action seriously interferes with patentees' freedom to negotiate and enter into contracts. Most importantly, courts should interpret current patent law to properly construe the scope of claims to genes and genetic diagnostic methods and use the requirements for patentability to ensure that only deserving claims receive patent protection.
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Congress Should Enact a Statutory Research Exemption
Congress should expand the current experimental use exemption to immunize researchers from infringement liability for their research efforts involving patented genes. The experimental use exemption is a product of common law that provides a defense to patent infringement for "experimental use." 234 Many academic researchers assume their research activities are covered by the experimental use exemption, 235 but the current exemption is actually quite narrow and covers a very limited class of research.
In Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit established the narrow limits of the current doctrine. 236 Prior to this case, there was little precedent to guide the application of the experimental use defense. 237 In particular, there had been almost no cases in which a nonprofit, educational institution was alleged as the infringer. 238 But this scenario arose in Madey, and the Federal Circuit rejected the fairly broad construction given to the experimental use exemption by the district court. 239 The district court classified experimental uses as those that are "solely for research, academic, or experimental purposes." 240 The district court, relying on a previous opinion from the Federal Circuit, further held that the exemption applied to experimental, nonprofit purposes. 241 But, the Federal Circuit rejected this interpretation of the experimental use exemption and instead provided a much stricter construction. 242 The court held that the exemption does not cover activities that are "in any way commercial in nature" or "conduct that . . As applied to major research universities, school funded research projects further the university's "business objectives" by educating students and faculty, strengthening the school's reputation as a research institution, and attracting desirable students and faculty. 244 Thus, the experimental use exemption does not afford immunity from infringement liability to such research. 245 The Federal Circuit has made clear that the exemption applies only to activities undertaken for "amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry." 246 In reality, lawsuits against researchers are rare. 247 A patent holder stands to gain little in either money or reputation by suing a research institution. 248 Rather, lawsuits are more likely to arise when the alleged infringer is engaging in commercial activity. 249 For example, Myriad only actively enforced its patents against researchers when they began performing commercial-level testing. 250 Despite this reality, the mere possibility of being sued is likely enough to prevent some researchers from engaging in even noncommercial research activities. For this reason, a statutory research exemption would prove valuable.
Because the current experimental use exemption is so narrow, the Court must either broaden the construction of the current doctrine, or Congress must provide some type of statutory protection for research involving patented genes. Such congressional action would both encourage research and alleviate fear of lawsuits for patent infringement, thereby addressing several of the concerns of gene patent opponents. Enabling research on patented genes would allow nonholders of patents to confirm experimental results, enhance the quality of existing genetic tests, and promote further innovation involving the patented genes. 248. See id. at 259 (distinguishing public, noncommercial research from private research, and noting that university research especially is perceived as being "more noble and in need of protection" than research by biotechnology companies, which are "portrayed as villains, using patents to block university research"). A compulsory licensing scheme should not be implemented, because compulsory licenses will interfere with a patent holder's freedom to contract. Under a compulsory licensing scheme, the holder of a gene patent would be required to license certain patent rights to licensees.
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Some commentators have suggested that gene patent holders should be forced to license their rights to isolated sequences of DNA to any scientist conducting commercial research pertaining to the gene. 252 In return, the licensee would pay a reasonable licensing fee to the licensor, with the fee based on the value of the product resulting from the licensee's research. 253 In theory, this scheme encourages licensees to invest in research because the royalty they pay would be proportional to the success they achieve in their research. 254 It also motivates patent holders to license their inventions because they would be compensated by successful licensees. 255 Congress should not yet take such extreme action for multiple reasons. First, biotechnology companies already have natural incentives to engage in voluntary license agreements because each additional application involving the claimed gene increases the value of the patent. 256 Second, the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a patented invention lies at the heart of patent rights, and a patentee has the right to refuse to license his patented product. 257 The government should not interfere with a company's ability to freely enter into contractual license agreements with whomever the company chooses. And finally, there already exist some limits on a patentee's to exercise its march-in rights. 266 March-in rights are also available if action is necessary to address health or safety needs. 267 While no federal agency has actually exercised march-in rights yet, march-in petitions have requested that federal agencies march in and mandate licensing. For example, in 1997, CellPro sought a license for stem-cell separation technology that was developed at The Johns Hopkins University under a grant from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). 268 When CellPro failed to obtain a license and was found liable for patent infringement, it petitioned for government march in. 269 CellPro claimed both that the University and Baxter Healthcare Corporation, the ultimate sublicensee, had failed to take reasonable steps to achieve a practical application for the patented invention and that government action was needed to address health and safety needs not met by Baxter.
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The NIH, however, found that Baxter was taking reasonable steps to achieve practical application. 271 The NIH also found that a health need existed, but that Baxter was reasonably addressing that need.
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Various parties expressed concern that exercising march-in rights in this situation would undermine existing licensing rights. 273 Ultimately, the NIH declined to march in, due, at least in part, to overwhelming public opposition. 274 The public opposition to the CellPro petition suggests that march-in rights are not an ideal solution to balancing interests in the gene patent debate. March-in rights raise concerns similar to those raised by compulsory licenses, namely that threatening or exercising march-in rights interferes with contractual freedom in the marketplace. 275 Parties should be free to negotiate the terms of their license agreements, including the terms for terminating rights under the license. March Indeed, a patent holder profits each time he licenses his invention.
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Threatening or invoking march-in rights against holders of gene patents, thereby interfering with the public's freedom to contract, is not a preferred solution to the gene patent debate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Genes and diagnostic methods are patent-eligible subject matter under current patent law, and if the Supreme Court grants certiorari in Association for Molecular Pathology for a second time, it should continue to hold them as such. Courts can properly exclude claims undeserving of patent protection by ensuring the requirements of utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure are met. Carving out genes as an additional exception to patent-eligible subject matter threatens far-reaching and unforeseen consequences. To balance the competing interests of incentivizing research and making genetic testing and treatment available and affordable to patients, Congress should enact a statutory research exemption that immunizes researchers from infringement liability for performing noncommercial activities involving the patented gene. Such congressional action would both encourage research and alleviate fear of lawsuits for patent infringement, thereby addressing several concerns of gene patent opponents. Enabling research on patented genes would allow nonholders of patents to confirm experimental results, enhance the quality of existing genetic tests, and promote further innovation involving the patented genes.
In contrast, Congress should view with caution suggested solutions like compulsory licensing or exercising march-in rights under the BayhDole Act. Such action seriously interferes with patent holders' freedom to negotiate and enter into contracts and will likely meet serious public opposition. These proposals overemphasize the desire to make genetic testing and treatment readily available, while ignoring the need to incentivize innovation and commercialization.
Ideal balancing solutions give appropriate weight to the need to incentivize biotechnology research. In discussing the importance of accessible and affordable genetic testing, it is important to remember that without patent protection the biotechnology research that lies at the heart of these discoveries might never have occurred. The genetic tests to which patients demand access would never have been developed. For this reason, any solution ultimately implemented must give fair consideration to the need to incentivize innovation within the biotechnology industry so that the public may continue to benefit from its efforts.
